> Certificate revocation does not work. [...] OCSP is susceptible to a MitM attack (exactly the scenario in which you want it to work!).
with
> The only way to effectively revoke certificates in the numbers necessary after heartbleed is for the CAs to revoke their intermediary certs.
That is, how are the intermediate certificates supposed to be revoked if certificate revocation does not work relibably ?
Also, I'd note that certification revocation can be made to work by the browser simply refusing to continue if it's unable to check certification revocation status (either due to an active MITM or other genuine network errors). Granted this comes at the cost of great user inconvenience, but that's almost always the tradeoff with increased security.
> Certificate revocation does not work. [...] OCSP is susceptible to a MitM attack (exactly the scenario in which you want it to work!).
with
> The only way to effectively revoke certificates in the numbers necessary after heartbleed is for the CAs to revoke their intermediary certs.
That is, how are the intermediate certificates supposed to be revoked if certificate revocation does not work relibably ?
Also, I'd note that certification revocation can be made to work by the browser simply refusing to continue if it's unable to check certification revocation status (either due to an active MITM or other genuine network errors). Granted this comes at the cost of great user inconvenience, but that's almost always the tradeoff with increased security.