> whether thinking requires exceeding the Turing computable
I've never seen any evidence that thinking requires such a thing.
And honestly I think theoretical computational classes are irrelevant to analysing what AI can or cannot do. Physical computers are only equivalent to finite state machines (ignoring the internet).
But the truth is that if something is equivalent to a finite state machine, with an absurd number of states, it doesn't really matter.
Hence why I finished the sentence "and we have no evidence to suggest that is even possible".
I think it's exceedingly improbable that we're any more than very advanced automatons, but I like to keep the door ajar and point out that the burden is on those claiming this to present even a single example of a function we can compute that is outside the Turing computable if they want to open that door..
> Physical computers are only equivalent to finite state machines (ignoring the internet)
Physical computers are equivalent to Turing machines without the tape as long as they have access to IO.
I've never seen any evidence that thinking requires such a thing.
And honestly I think theoretical computational classes are irrelevant to analysing what AI can or cannot do. Physical computers are only equivalent to finite state machines (ignoring the internet).
But the truth is that if something is equivalent to a finite state machine, with an absurd number of states, it doesn't really matter.