The reason Matrix hasn't prioritised metadata protection earlier is:
* If you're particularly concerned about metadata footprint, you can run your own servers in whatever network environment you feel like - you are NOT surrendering metadata to some central or 3rd party server as you would in a centralised platform.
* We've had to focus on getting decentralised encryption stable, which turns out to be hard enough without also throwing in metadata protection - it's only this year that we've turned that corner.
* Unless you're using a mixnet, network traffic gives away a significant amount of metadata anyway.
Anyway, yes: Matrix can do better on obfuscating metadata on servers, and we'll continue improving it in 2026.
Meanwhile, if anyone's feeling nostalgic you can see a presentation I wrote preempting the challenge of metadata protection back in 2016 (on the day we first turned on E2EE in Matrix, ironically): https://matrix.org/~matthew/2015-06-26%20Matrix%20Jardin%20E.... In some other world perhaps we would have got to this point sooner, but better late than never.
EDIT: I can't face going through all the other points in this post, but it's worth noting that some of it is just entirely false - e.g. the hackea claims of "an impressive collection of private data being sent to Matrix central servers, even when you use your own instance", or the fact that media isn't authed (it has been since Jun 2024). Meanwhile the abuse situation has evolved significantly in 2025, with stuff like https://matrix.org/blog/2025/02/building-a-safer-matrix/ and https://matrix.org/blog/2025/12/policyserv as well as hiring up a larger trust & safety team at the Matrix Foundation.
People here always want to run the software themselves first, but then the next day they want to pay someone else to host it. If you're running into people throwing security flags, the silver lining is you're also a stone's throw away from offering a hosted option.
"If you're particularly concerned about metadata footprint, you can run your own servers in whatever network environment you feel like"
You're not going to win any long-term support with this attitude, even if you're technically right. Like, if we're still in this "why doesn't the pleb just become a part time sysadmin" way of thinking, it's hard to think it's not just DoA.
Well, that's why the first half of the post spells out the work that we're doing to improve the metadata footprint. The second half that you're quoting explains why we didn't solve this back in 2014.
I found your explanation sufficient: obviously, you are going to find people who find fault in anything, but thanks for the transparency and the effort put into explaining the prioritization and/or workarounds which justify it.
Frankly, I'm not sure why explaining it (or the explanation) makes the situation any better.
FWIW, I'm the kind of weirdo who gets annoyed by having to add a new noscript rule for every federated instance. So I'm not exactly Matrix's target audience.
For what it's worth, we've been working on improving Matrix's metadata footprint this year: MSC4362 (https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/blob/kay...) got implemented on matrix-js-sdk for encrypting room state (currently behind a labs flag on Element Web: https://github.com/element-hq/element-web/blob/develop/docs/...). Meanwhile more radical proposals like MSC4256 (https://github.com/dklimpel/matrix-spec-proposals/blob/mls-R...) go and remove senders entirely and encrypt room state via MLS.
The reason Matrix hasn't prioritised metadata protection earlier is:
* If you're particularly concerned about metadata footprint, you can run your own servers in whatever network environment you feel like - you are NOT surrendering metadata to some central or 3rd party server as you would in a centralised platform.
* We've had to focus on getting decentralised encryption stable, which turns out to be hard enough without also throwing in metadata protection - it's only this year that we've turned that corner.
* Unless you're using a mixnet, network traffic gives away a significant amount of metadata anyway.
Anyway, yes: Matrix can do better on obfuscating metadata on servers, and we'll continue improving it in 2026.
Meanwhile, if anyone's feeling nostalgic you can see a presentation I wrote preempting the challenge of metadata protection back in 2016 (on the day we first turned on E2EE in Matrix, ironically): https://matrix.org/~matthew/2015-06-26%20Matrix%20Jardin%20E.... In some other world perhaps we would have got to this point sooner, but better late than never.
EDIT: I can't face going through all the other points in this post, but it's worth noting that some of it is just entirely false - e.g. the hackea claims of "an impressive collection of private data being sent to Matrix central servers, even when you use your own instance", or the fact that media isn't authed (it has been since Jun 2024). Meanwhile the abuse situation has evolved significantly in 2025, with stuff like https://matrix.org/blog/2025/02/building-a-safer-matrix/ and https://matrix.org/blog/2025/12/policyserv as well as hiring up a larger trust & safety team at the Matrix Foundation.