it would be incredibly easy for apple to frame this as a security issue, because, even in my mind, it is. I pay for apple devices because I trust apple with my data. I do not trust most companies with my data. I trust my data to only flow through Apple's servers, and to get a clear indication when my data is _not_ flowing through apple's servers (e.g. green bubbles). A company bypassing this causing messages to show up blue when they are in fact traveling outside of Apple's control is a security risk (to me). Clearly if it's e2e encrypted that's not the case, but that's not what apple is going to argue. They're going to argue exactly what I just did. And I honestly agree with them. That doesn't mean Apple doesn't need to allow other companies onto the platform, just that BLUE BUBBLES mean something to apple customers and bypassing that is something that apple needs to block.
Apple really needs to get that RCS implementation rolled out though. Wonder if it's still going to be green bubbles or something else.
I think this pypush method uses Apple servers. I think the key aspect was the author figuring out how submit public keys and request public keys for other Apple users from Apple servers. From that point it seems to be as secure as public key cryptography.
i mean... will the court understand that? Or will they understand the argument I framed (however dumb it is)? I think apple would easily be able to convince the court that anything exiting their servers is less secure, or gives the appearance of lower security, to their customers. Anyway, apple is implementing rcs next year so hopefully none of this matters.
Apple really needs to get that RCS implementation rolled out though. Wonder if it's still going to be green bubbles or something else.