The BIOS never reads the logo image from OS partitions on a drive. It either gets it from firmware stored in flash on the motherboard, or from the EFI system partition on the harddrive. Thus dropping the logo file on ESP partition or reflashing the firmware are the two attack vectors.
Writing to other partitions is not an attack vector for this vulnerability, so encrypting those partitions does not protect against it.
> Writing to other partitions is not an attack vector for this vulnerability
I'm not saying that this is the attack vector for this vulnerability. I'm merely stating that utilizing the exploit to place a file as the video shows, wouldn't be possible if your main C: /root partition is encrypted.
If your main drive partition is not encrypted, than that can lead to the ability to dropping a file on the desktop.
I suppose, yes, if someone codes "wait_until_encryption_is_completed" function.
